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Publicity exploitation of celebrities : 
protection of a star's style in Quebec civil law* 
Susan H. ABRAMOVITCH** 
Les procédés actuels de publicité comportent souvent le recours à des 
caractéristiques d'expression de vedettes, à leur style. Des publicitaires 
ont ainsi utilisé des photographies de vedettes sans leur consentement. 
Dans quelle mesure le droit civil québécois protège-t-il ces célébrités 
contre l'utilisation, sans leur consentement, de leur image ? L'auteure 
cherche à répondre à cette question en faisant appel aux droits français, 
américain, de même qu'à celui des provinces canadiennes de common law. 
Qualifiant le droit à l'image de propriété intellectuelle, elle examine dif-
férentes espèces d'approbation de moyens d'expression de la vedette : sa 
voix, ses expressions typiques, son apparence. 
The use of celebrity imagery, or style, in advertising has become 
prevalent in recent times. Occasionally advertisers have used photographs 
of celebrities without having first obtained their consent. The author exa-
mines the possible legal bases existing in Quebec civil law which may serve 
to protect the celebrity against such non-consesual use of his or her 
picture, drawing on the experience of France, common law in Canada and 
the United States. Concluding that the right to style is an intellectual 
property right, the author applies this basis to other instances of style 
appropriation : the use of voice, sound-alikes, look-alikes and typical 
expressions. 
* The author would like to thank Professor H. Patrick Glenn of the Faculty of Law of 
McGill University, for his support and guidance in the preparation of this article, and 
William Sobel, for his first-hand insight into the Midler case. 
** B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill). 
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A sign of a celebrety is often that his name is worth 
more than his services. 
(Daniel J. Boorstin)1 
Despite his cynicism with respect to the artistic and intellectual value 
of contemporary America's popular heroes, lawyer/historian Daniel J. 
Boorstin in these words realistically identifies a key by-product of star-
dom : commodity endorsement. Cultivating a visible public personality 
requires a serious investment of money, time and creative energy. The 
tastes and desires of the masses must first be distilled and then accom-
modated by the aspiring celebrity, culminating in the development of a 
public style. The public's ability to identify the star upon perceiving an 
aspect of his or her style confirms that person's celebrity, i.e., that condi-
tion defined as : 
[...] fame ; renown ; the distinction or honor publicly bestowed on one because of 
noted character or exploits.2 
1. D.J. BOORSTIN, The Image : A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, New York, Harper 
& Row, 1964, p. 220. 
2. Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary of the English Language, 2e éd., É.-U., Collins 
World, 1977. 
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The advertising world has capitalized on this public appeal of celeb-
rities and has transformed it into market appeal : "In [advertising] trade 
jargon, celebrities are 'big names'."3 Product promoters are willing to pay 
handsomely for the permission to associate a celebrity with their goods, 
even if only implicitly, in order to profit from the star's public goodwill. The 
ability of the celebrity's name or likeness to attract attention and evoke a 
desired response in a particular consumer audience evidences this good-
will, or recognition value, generated by that star. This promotion strategy 
enables the advertiser to increase the value or the sales of its product by 
linking the celebrity's identity with that of the product. 
The attractiveness of any useful idea often leads to less-than-legiti-
mate attempts to reap its benefits while avoiding its costs. The use of 
celebrities in advertising is no exception to this phenomenon. In the recent 
California case of Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company4, the respon-
dent, through the advertising firm hired by it, approached the well-known 
actress/singer plaintiff with precisely the strategy outlined above. The 
respondent proposed juxtaposing "The Divine Miss M"'s vocals with 
visuals of its product, automobiles, in a television commercial. Ms. Midler 
refused. Undeterred by Ms. Midler's rejection of this offer, the respondent 
proceeded to enlist the services of an unknown singer. This performer 
imitated Ms. Midler's singing voice in the advertisement at the request of 
the respondent. This case exemplifies the underhanded trend of what 
I designate as "publicity exploitation". 
From the perspective of policy, it does not seem desirable to allow 
advertisers to reap an economic windfall, without fear of penalty, while 
stripping celebrities of the dividends deserved from the investments they 
have made in themselves. In addition to this denial of compensation, the 
celebrity may suffer damages. The provision of publicity to one company 
may cause other companies to view the celebrity as an insincere, and thus 
unattractive, spokesperson. Free publicity for one sponsor, moreover, 
would deprive the celebrity of justification for the substantial fees charged 
to others ; the price commandable by the celebrity would be diluted due 
to the increase in supply of his or her advertising services. Exposing 
the celebrity's interests to such threats of prejudice would discourage 
potential stars from expending time and resources in developing the skills 
or achievements prerequisite to public recognition. This disincentive 
3. D.J. BOORSTIN, supra, note 1, p. 58. This practice has recently been called "character 
merchandising." See S. RICKETSON, «Crocodiles, Koalas and Athletes: Australia's 
Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Character Merchandising » (Address to the 
9th Commonwealth Law Conference, 1990) [unpublished]. 
4. Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, (1988), 849 F. 2d 260 (9th Cir.). 
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would eventually deprive society of the stars' enriching performances and 
endeavors. 
In Quebec law the protection of a celebrity's style has been minimally 
developed. This issue has generally arisen in cases of photograph use and 
has traditionally been analyzed under the rubric of the right to one's image. 
The determination of the legal nature of the right to image, however, 
remains controversial. 
The scope of the definition of ' 'image" is seldom provided in cases and 
doctrine ; on the rare occasion when direction is given, it is often cryptic5. 
The difficulty in the determination of the field encompassed by "image" 
probably stems from the differences between the everyday French and 
English definitions of this word. In the French language the focus of 
"image" is the picture: "cliché", "gravure", "illustration" and "por-
trait"6. In English, however, "image" is defined more abstractly as: 
[...] the concept of a person held by the general public, often one deliberately 
created or modified by publicity, advertising, etc.7 
A change in the terminology of this right would circumvent the semantic 
confusion caused by this language difference. I propose designating the 
right as one of "style", a term defined as : 
[...] specific or characteristic manner of expression, execution, construction or 
design, in any art, period, work, employment, etc. ; distinction, excellence, origin-
ality and character in any form of artistic or literary expression.8 
The word « style », in this way, focuses on the mode of expression. The 
connection to art drawn in this definition demonstrates the suitability of the 
term for labelling the celebrity's mode of expression of his or her creative 
public identity. 
In the first part of this paper, I will attempt to distill the most appro-
priate legal basis in Quebec law for the right to style in the context of use of 
the celebrity's photograph for publicity exploitation purposes. Once the 
foundation for the right has been determined, I will explore the scope of 
style encompassed by this right. I shall examine how far the protection of 
5. See Deschamps c. Renault Canada, CS. Montréal, 0581014071, 24 février 1972; 
reported at (1977) 18 C. de D. 937, in which the right to image is said to encompass "name 
and likenesses" p. 940, but in which the right is more broadly constituted p. 943: 
"names, likenesses and photographs" (emphasis added). The inclusion of both the 
words "likenesses" and "photographs" in the second definition suggests that the right 
to one's image extends beyond cases of control of photograph reproduction and dif-
fusion. 
6. Definitions taken from Le Petit Robert, Paris, Société du Nouveau Littré, 1970. 
7. Webster's New 20th Century Dictionnary of the English Language, supra, note 2. 
8. Id. 
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style afforded by Quebec law can be extended by focusing on publicity 
exploitation of voice, typical expressions, look-alikes and sound-alikes. 
1. The right to style : photograph publication 
1.1. Generally 
The right of a person to his or her style has been extensively developed 
in both civil law and common law jurisprudence and doctrine in the context 
of publication of photographs. In no jurisdiction, however, has this devel-
opment culminated in firm agreement on the most appropriate basis for the 
right. Judges and authors oscillate between the basic categories of civil 
responsibility and property when classifying the right to one's style. This 
taxonomy is further confused in Quebec and France where authoritative 
sources subclassify protection of style either as a patrimonial right9, as an 
extra-patrimonial right of personalityl0 or, more specifically, as an element 
of the right to privacy", in Canadian common law jurisdictions, the unau-
thorized use of one's photograph is sometimes analyzed under the rubric of 
"passing off ' l2, an aspect of unfair competition. In the United States, the 
development of the "right to publicity"13 supplements the common law 
approaches. Finally, references to defamation14, breach of contract15 and 
unjust enrichment16 appear occasionally in the search for the most suitable 
basis for describing the mode of reparation for the breach of the right to 
one's style. 
9. Deschamps c. Renault Canada, supra, note 5 ; B. EDELMAN, « Liberté et création dans 
la propriété littéraire et artistique : esquisse d'une théorie du sujet » D.1970. Chr. (KLI) 
197-200 ; J. STOUFFLET, « Le droit de la personne sur son image (quelques remarques sur 
la protection de la personnalité) » J.C.P. 1957.1.1374. 
10. H., L. et J. MAZEAU, Leçons de droit civil, t.l, vol.2, 7e éd., par F. CHABAS, Paris, 
Montchrestiens, 1986; R. NERSON, Droits extrapatrimoniaux, Lyon, Bosc Frères 
M. & L. Riou, 1939. 
11. Cohen v. Queenswear International Ltd., (1989) R.R.A. 570 (CS.) ; H.P. GLENN, «Le 
droit au respect de la vie privée », (1979) 39Ä. du B. 879 ; H.P. GLENN, « Le secret de la 
vie privée en droit québécois», (1974) 5 R.G.D. 24; H.P. GLENN, «Civil Respon-
sability—Right to Privacy in Quebec —Recent Cases », (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 297 ; 
M. CARON, « Le code civil québécois, instrument de protection des droits et libertés de 
la personne ? », (1978) 56 Can. Bar Rev. 197, p. 206-207 ; E. DELEURY, « Une perspective 
nouvelle : le sujet reconnu comme objet du droit », (1972) 13 C. de D. 529. 
12. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., (1974) 1 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. CA.), rev'g 1972, 2 O.R. 
(2d) 133 (Ont. H.C.) \Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd, (1978) 17 O.R. (2d)425 
(Ont. H.C). 
13. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, (1979) 160 Cal.Rptr. 323 (Sup.) ; Haelan Laboratories 
Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., (1953) 202 F.2d. 866 (2d. Cir.). 
14. Field c. United Amusements Corporation Ltd (1971) CS. 283. 
15. J. RAVANAS, La protection des personnes contre la réalisation et la publication de leur 
image, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1978, p. 89 s. 
16. Cohen v. Queenswear International Ltd, supra, note 11. 
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In this part, the applicability of each of these legal foundations to the 
scenario of the celebrity involved in advertising will be explored. The 
nature and respective advantages and disadvantages of each category will 
be canvassed with a view to determining which is the most appropriate 
means of protecting style in the Quebec civil law system. 
Although the categories have been separated for the purposes of 
analysis, they are by no means watertight compartments. On the contrary, 
the theoretical nature of each possible basis of the right may overlap with 
that of another. The categories, furthermore, are not mutually exclusive in 
practice ; publication of one's photograph, for example, may simultane-
ously give rise to both a delictual action and an action based on interference 
with a property right17. Instances of possible coincidence are indicated 
below. 
1.2. Defamation/libel 
Civil defamation and libel consist, respectively, of verbal and written 
[...] atteinte[s] portée[s] à la réputation ou à l'honneur d'une personne, même 
morale, de même que toute imputation de nature à l'exposer à la haine, au mépris 
ou même seulement au ridicule.18 
If no factual foundation underlies such an imputation, then the speaker or 
writer may be delictually responsible under art. 1053 C.C.L.C.19. 
In Field20 the defendant produced a documentary, "Woodstock". 
This film included both footage of the non-celebrity petitioner frolicking 
unclad at the 1969 rock festival and a scene which suggested that the 
petitioner had engaged in sexual intercourse with a companion. The peti-
oner requested an interlocutory injunction, enjoining the defendant from 
screening this film, on the basis of defamation. The court rejected the 
petition on the facts of the case21. In laying out the criteria for defamation, 
however, the Court implicitly recognized that this type of action could 
protect against the unauthorized use of a person's photograph in other 
circumstances. 
17. H.P. GLENN, «Le droit au respect de la vie privée», supra, note 11, p. 889. 
18. A. NADEAU, Traité de droit civil du Québec, t. 8, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1949, 
p. 216. 
19. Id. 
20. Field v. United Amusements Corporation Ltd, supra, note 14. 
21. Id., p. 286 : « Rien dans la preuve ne suggère la malice de l'opérateur de la camera ni son 
indiscrétion, dans le contexte de tout le film... qui semble bien d'intérêt public... [Le 
requérant et sa compagne] nient avoir eu des relations sexuelles : la séquence ne montre 
rien de tel... La facilité d'identification [du requérant] n'est pas prouvée à la satisfaction 
du tribunal... S[i le requérant] est vraiment humilié de s'y voir, pourquoi est-il allé voir le 
film deux fois à quatre jours d'intervalle ? » 
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This basis for the right protects the celebrity only in very narrow 
circumstances. A plaintif seeking relief would have to demonstrate "une 
imputation contraire à la vérité » »22 and subjection to ridicule. This foun-
dation would not relieve the celebrety whose photograph has been used by 
an advertiser without authorization unless the celebrity actually disap-
proves of the product with which he or she is associated and unless this 
association tarnishes the celebrity's reputation. Such situations would 
arise infrequently, as it is in the advertiser's business interest to portray the 
celebrity in a positive light in order for the celebrity's good reputation to be 
fused with the promoted product. 
The right to one's style can be founded on much broader bases which 
protect the individuality of the person and not merely his reputation23. 
These wider bases will be examined below. 
1.3. Contract 
Explicit private regulation of the use of one's style is always an option 
available to the celebrety. In Deschamps24, for example, the film-perfor-
mance contract of one of the petitioners, Dominique Michel, contained a 
clause reserving her the right to approve all photographs used in publicity 
for the movie25. Breach of such a provision may give rise to contractual 
damages26. This protection, however, is very limited ; often the person who 
uses and benefits from the celebrity's photograph is not a party to any such 
contract. The facts of the Deschamps case27 provide a good example. 
The defendant, Renault Canada, agreed with Mojac Film Cinema, one of 
the film's producers, to exchange loaned cars for photographs of the 
petitioners standing beside Renault autos and for the right to exploit 
these photos. No contractual relation, however, linked Renault Canada to 
Ms. Michel. Her action against Renault Canada, therefore, could not have 
been grounded in contract28. Ms. Michel's sole contractual remedy re-
quired suing the co-contractor, her employer, Mojac Films Cinema. This 
22. Id., p. 285. 
23. The distinction between protection of individuality and protection of reputation is drawn 
in H.P. GLENN, «Civil responsability-Right to Privacy in Quebec-Recent Cases», 
supra, note 11, p. 299. 
24. Deschamps v. Renault, supra, note 5. 
25. Id., p. 938 : «Article 4.05 — Dominique Michel aura un droit de regard sur toutes les 
photos utilisées dans la publicité de film et aura un droit de veto sur toutes photos qui la 
représentent entièrement ou en partie, droit toutefois qu'elle s'engage à exercer raison-
nablement. » 
26. Art. 1065, C.C.L.C. 
27. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5. 
28. The Deschamps case involved a motion for injunction against Reanult, not damages ; it 
was not, in fact, grounded in contract. 
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option was probably unattractive to Ms. Michel due to the ongoing nature 
of the parties' relationship. 
More commonly, there is no explicit contractual provision which 
allocates the right to use the celebrity's photograph. Even in the absence of 
such a clause, however, a co-contractor may be able to profit from the use 
of a photograph. By the very nature of an actor's undertaking to act in a 
film, an implied incidental term29, authorizing the producer to use the 
actor's photograph for purposes of the film's promotion, may be incor-
porated into the actor's contract of performance. In this way, the celeb-
rity's right to control the publication of his photograph may be implicitly 
ceded or, at least, implicitly limited. 
There is a tendency, furthermore, to imply consent to photograph 
publication when the subject of the picture is a public person engaged in 
public activity30, even in the absence of any contractual link whatsoever 
between the subject and the publisher : 
II est constant que la publication de l'image d'une personnalité publique est libre, 
car \a nature de l'activité exercé implique, dans une certaine mesure, renonciation 
au secret de l'existence, Il en résulte qu'un consentement spécial, à la diffusion de 
leur image, n'est pas exigé.3' 
Moreover, an entertainer's past tolerance of the publication of his or her 
photograph is sometimes viewed as implicit general consent to cede control 
over his or her style32. 
This tacit consent, in addition to serving as possible exoneration for an 
invasion of the right to privacy33, may provide the basis for the finding of a 
contractual relationship34. It is possible to argue the celebrity's act of 
permitting a photographer to film the celebrity or of tolerating publication 
in the past may constitute the proof necessary to imply consent to a 
convention which authorizes the photographer-party to publish the photo. 
The exact force of this implied consent is not settled. Some authorities 
suggest that consent is a necessary implication of the public nature of the 
29. Incorporated into contract pursuant to art. 1024, C.C.L.C. 
30. "Public activity" refers to the person's activities outside his or her personal sphere: 
work, interaction with the media, etc. 
31. B. EDELMAN, supra, note 9, p. 120. 
32. See Benoit c. Société radio-télévision du Québec, CS. Rouyn-Noranda, 600-05-00023-
83, 10 March 1983, J.E. 83-525 p. 5, in which traditional tolerance was one factor 
considered in holding that the performer had ceded the right to her style. However, 
perhaps a higher standard was imposed on the plaintiff due to the exceptional nature of 
the relief requested, i.e., interlocutory injunction. 
33. Discussed supra, in section 1.6. 
34. Art. 988, C.C.B.C. 
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person and his activity35 while others insist that this implication is merely a 
rebuttable presumption, which reverses the burden of disproving this 
exonerating factor onto the celebrity36. In the Deschamps case37, Roth-
man J. did not feel compelled to find such tacit consent: 
While it may seem unusual and it does seem insouciant on petitioners' part to have 
allowed 18 photographs to be taken without a clear understanding of their purpose, 
the Court cannot conclude that this in itself constituted tacit consent that they be 
used in a commercial poster.38 
Some authors stress, however, that even if a person is a public figure and 
consent to publication is presumed, this does not necessarily entail a 
presumption of consent with respect to all possible uses of the image : 
Utilisée pour illustrer, un fait d'actualité ou un événement public, l'image ne sera 
soumise à aucun régime de protection, mais, si elle doit, par exemple, servira une 
réclame publicitaire, la situation sera entièrement différente?9 
The situations contemplated in this paper fall under this second category, 
"réclame[s] publicitaires[s]". It is unlikely, therefore, that consent to 
publication will be presumed. One author, moreover, in rejecting the 
implication completely, recognized the artificality of this presumption40. 
Furthermore, the traditional tolerance presumption has been rejected in 
doctrine41 and in caselaw42. 
A celebrity's cession of control over his or her style by tacit agreement 
can only affect a small range of practical scenarios. Although express 
words need not be communicated, some kind of relationship must exist 
between the parties. At the very least, the parties must have had a mini-
35. See, e.g., B. EDELMAN, note 9, p. 120. 
36. See, e.g., p. MOLINARI, « Le droit de la personne sur son image en droit québécois et 
français: rapport générale » (1977) 12 R.J.T. 95, p. 100-101 ; H., L. et J. MAZEAUD, 
supra, note 10, p. 931. 
37. Deschamps c. Renault Canada, supra, note 5. 
38. Id., p. 940. 
39. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 109. (Emphasis added.) 
40. J. RAVANAS, supra, note 15, 167-169. Ravanas explains that such an implication would 
be fictitious in that « [elle] conduit à diluer le consentement de la personne représentée 
'jusqu'au point où l'on ne prend même plus en considération son élément essentiel : la 
volonté.' » 
41. H.L. et J. Mazeaud, supra, note 10, p. 932. 
42. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5, as interpreted by H.P. GLEEN, «Civil 
Responsability-Right to Privacy in Quebec-Recent Cases », supra, note 11, p. 302. 
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mum of contact before the photo was used in order to witness the acts 
which constitute the implicit consent : 
Le consentement est implicite ou tacite quand il s'extériorise par un compor-
tement, une conduite ou l'accomplissement d'un acte qui suppose une volonté de 
contracter.43 
The cases examined in this paper involve defendants who have used the 
celebrity's photo to market their products. Often the plaintiff has never had 
any previous contact with the defendant, let alone knowledge of the defen-
dant's existence. To suggest, ex post facto, that a contract existed between 
such unfamiliar parties is a tenuous proposition. 
The only contractual relief which may protect the celebrity from these 
unrelated parties is actually a quasi-contractual one : the action de in rem 
verso44. Although never explicitly used in the context of the celebrity's 
right to his style, this concept of unjust enrichment may be accepted by a 
court in the absence of any other recourse. To succeed, the celebrity would 
have to demonstrate45, first, the enrichment of the advertiser-defendant. 
Money saved by not paying the celebrity for the endorsement and profits 
gained due to increased sales attributable to the endorsement may qualify 
as enrichment. Second, the celebrity would be required to demonstrate 
impoverishment : revenue potentially gained through a promotion contract 
with the defendant or reduction in his or her commandable fee due to the 
saturation of his advertising market. Third, the enrichment and the impov-
erishment must be connected. Finally, to succeed, the enrichment cannot 
be legally or contractually justified. 
In an unjust enrichment action, the absence of contact between the 
parties would not necessarily preclude recovery. The celebrity could re-
ceive compensatory relief equivalent to the lesser of the impoverishment 
and the enrichment46. The development of this ground as a basis for 
recovery has been stifled, however, due to the availability of other res-
titutionary bases for image protection47. The general notion of unjust 
enrichment, however, may underlie some of these other legal bases. 
43. M. TANCELIN, Des obligations : contrat et responsabilité, 4e éd., Montréal, Wilson & 
Lafleur, 1988, p. 48. 
44. Available in Quebec by virtue of the decision of Cie Immobilière Viger Ltée v. Lauréat 
Giguére Inc., (1977) S.CR. 67. 
45. Conditions as explained in J.L. BAUDOUIN, Les Obligations, 3e éd., Montréal, Les 
Éditions Yvon Biais, 1989, p. 330 et S. 
46. Id., p. 336. 
47. See Cohen v. Queenswear International Ltd, supra, note 11, p. 579. 
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1.4. Delict 
A more common approach of courts in all jurisdictions is to categorize 
interference with the right to style as a civil law delict48 or as a common law 
tort49. In Quebec, the case of Robbins v. Canadian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion50 introduced this delictual approach, although with little guidance as to 
the precise nature of the wrong. In that case, a television viewer wrote a 
letter of criticism to a C.B.C. producer. In retaliation, the host of the 
criticized programme, on the air, deliberately requested viewers to write or 
call the critic and provided the plaintiffs address and telephone number. 
The court held this act "constituted a grievous positive wrongful act 
against [the plaintiff] making the defendant corporation responsible for 
the damages flowing from such wrongful act,"51 based on article 1053 
C.C.L.C. Rather than specify the nature of the delict, Scott J. retreated 
unhelpfully : "There is no need to attempt any precise definition of this 
fault which defendant's servants committed."52 
Although Robbins is not overly pithy nor do its facts parallel the 
scenarios contemplated in this paper53, this case does aid in the determina-
tion of the proper legal basis underlying the right to one's style. By 
judicially recognizing this delict, Robbins provided the impetus for recent 
judicial elaboration in Quebec on the nature of this wrong, primarily in the 
context of photograph use. The right to privacy54 and substitution55 are two 
areas of such elaboration. 
Generally, in order to prevail on the basis of delict, a celebrity would 
bear the burden of demonstrating fault in the defendant's use of his or her 
photograph as well as the resulting prejudice suffered56. 
48. See, e.g., Paradis c. Marquis (1977) R.L. 555 (C.P.). 
49. See, e.g., Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, supra, note 4. 
50. Robbins v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (1958) CS. 152. 
51. Id., p. 156. 
52. Id., p. 157. 
53. In Robbins : the plaintiff was not a celebrity ; the defendant did not gain from the use of 
the plaintiffs image ; and it was not the photograph of the plaintiff thas was used, but 
rather his name and address. 
54. Discussed supra. Section F. Some jurists, however, seem to suggest that delictual 
responsibility may exist for an invasion of privacy absent a subjective right to privacy. 
See, e.g., J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, note 68. 
55. Discussed supra, section 1.9. 
56. Art. 1053, C.C.L.C. 
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1.5. Right of personality 
Contemporary French law has tended towards characterizing the right 
to one's style as a right of personality57. This subset of extra-patrimonial 
rights58 is made up of subjective rights, distinguishable from patrimonial 
rights in their non-susceptibility to pecuniary evaluation. Kayser defines 
that which he names the right to one's image in this context as : 
[...] un pouvoir que la jurisprudence consacre au profit des personnes, dans leur 
intérêt, en leur permettant de s'opposer à la publication de leur image... Au droit 
de la personnalité de la personne représentée, correspond pour [les autres] une 
obligation de ne pas publier l'image, ou plus exactement un devoir de ne pas faire 
de cette publication, une charge extrapatrimoniale.59 
These rights are said to be "hors commerce" and inseparable from the 
person from whom they extend60. 
The consequences of being categorized as an extra-patrimonial right, 
according to one conception of such rights, are threefold. First, fault need 
not be demonstrated61 by the celebrity plaintiff in order to obtain relief for 
interference with the right. Second, neither must prejudice suffered62 be 
proved. Third, so classified, style would be inalienable, unseizable, impre-
scriptable and intransmissible upon death63. Logically, the death of the 
person puts an end to his personality rights as "le droit n'existe que par 
rapport à la personne physique de son titulaire."64 It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that protection of his or her personality rights would be 
completely non-existent after death : 
Les membres de sa famille ont en effet le pouvoir de s'opposer à [la] réalisation et à 
[la] publication [de son image...] Ce pouvoir n'est pas transmis aux héritiers de la 
personne décédée, mais acquis à ce moment par son conjoint et ses proches 
57. B. EDELMAN, supra, note 9; P. KAYSER, «Le droit dit à l'image» in Mélanges en 
l'honneur de Paul Roubier, vol. 2, Paris, Dalloz-Sirey, 1961, p. 73 ; R. NERSON, supra, 
note 10. 
58. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, note 45, p. 27. 
59. P. KAYSER, supra, note 57, p.81-82. 
60. H., L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, p. 948. 
61. P. KAYSER, supra, note 57, p. 81 ; MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 104. Other jurists do not 
accept such a clear distinction between the consequences of characterizing an invasion 
as a delict and those flowing from a breach-of-right characterization. In their view, fault 
may be as relevant a criterion in the latter characterization as in the former. See the 
discussion on the intensity of the obligation to respect the privacy of others in H.P. 
GLENN, «Le droit au respect de la vie privée», supra, note 11, p. 892-894. 
62. Id. ; J. STOUFFLET, supra, note 9, par. 20. However, in order to recover for damages 
suffered, prejudice must be proved. In addition, if injuctive relief is sought, at a 
minimum, threat of damage must be demonstrated. 
63. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 103 ; H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, p. 948 ; H.P. 
GLENN, «Le droit au respect de la vie privée», supra, note 11, p. 890. 
64. P. KAYSER, supra, note 57, p. 83. 
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parents. Ceux-ci agissent en leur nom personnel, à raison de l'atteinte portée à 
leurs sentiments pour le défunt.65 
Thus, the close relatives of the celebrity may be able to sue, in a personal 
capacity, for moral damages caused by the publication of his or her pho-
tograph. 
The characterization of the right to one's style as an extra-patrimonial 
right of personality is inappropriate in the context of the celebrity's public 
persona. The celebrity's external personality is a very important source of 
his or her commercial gain. The star's style does not lie outside commerce ; 
rather, 
[...] l'image est un moyen d'identification de la personne [...] Chez les acteurs, 
dont les traits constituent un élément de la personnalité professionnelle, il prend 
une ampleur considérable. Souvent d'ailleurs, c'est au prix d'un effort de création 
que l'artiste parvient à accuser l'originalité de sa physionomie pour en accroître 
l'efficacité comme source de notoriété et de succès. Nombreux sont les acteurs 
qui ont réussi à créer un type dont le pouvoir attractif se mesure au nombre des 
imitateurs. C'est une valeur qui est protégée par la reconnaissance, au profit du 
créateur, d'un véritable monopole d'exploitation et par l'attribution d'une indem-
nité réparatrice spéciale en cas de préjudice esthétique.66 
Allowing no one to control the use of a celebrity's photograph after his 
or her death, furthermore, seems unjust67. Acceptance of this characteriza-
tion of the right in the context of the celebrity would lead to the following 
result. If Ford Motor Company has used the photograph of Bette Midler, 
post-morterm, in its advertisement, then it would not have had to account 
to anyone for the resulting benefits received or expenses saved. The 
subject of the right, Ms. Midler, would no longer exist and it is unlikely that 
her close relatives would be able to prove that they suffered "atteinte 
portée à leurs sentiments pour le défunt" ; the association drawn between 
Ms. Midler and a particular automobile would not suggest such a com-
promise of her principles or reputation so as to personally prejudice her 
close relatives. Thus, although this categorization of the right to one's style 
may be appropriate vis à vis ordinary private persons, it is wholly unfitting 
in the cases of publicity exploitation of celebrities. 
1.6. Right to privacy 
Clearly the most accepted legal foundaton in Quebec doctrine for the 
right to personal style, when dealing with non-celebrities, is the right to 
65. id. 
66. J. STOUFFLET, supra, note 9, par. 26. 
67. See discussion, supra, section 1.8. 
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privacy68. The French jurist Jean Pradel defined the general right to privacy 
as: 
Le pouvoir d'interdire à des tiers d'avoir accès à [la] vie personnelle afin d'en 
préserver l'anonymat [...] Le droit de passer inaperçu.69 
Before the adoption of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms10, the 
nature of the right to privacy was undecided. J.L. Baudouin considered 
invasion of privacy a delict71 while H.P. Glenn predicted acceptance of the 
right as an extra-patrimonial right of personality72. The right to privacy was 
statutorily crystalized in 1977 in article 5 of the Charter and was thereby 
incorporated into the rights of personality. Using this human rights legisla-
tion to shield the right to one's style is advantageous for plaintiffs in its 
provision for exemplary damages73. 
In Cohen14, the Superior Court accepted that article 5, together with 
article 4, includes the right to control the publication of one's photographed 
image. In that recent case the non-celebrity plaintiff, clad in a skimpy 
bikini, had been photographed. The defendant reproduced these photos on 
the packaging of its products without first obtaining the consent of the 
plaintiff for this specific use. In finding for the plaintiff, Bishop J. left no 
doubt as to the inclusion of control of photograph use, in the circumstances 
at bar, under the umbrella of the right to privacy : 
The right to [the] safeguard [of] one's dignity and to respect for one's private life 
must include the right to prevent photos of one's semi-naked body from being 
displayed to the public for commercial use without one's prior consent.75 
An issue that is constantly raised in cases of the celebrity's right to 
style is the apparent contradiction in analyzing situations involving public 
persons acting within the sphere of their public lives under the rubric of 
privacy protection. Privacy is hardly the goal of a star. Most celebrities 
depend upon the diffusion of their photographed images in order to gain 
public recognition and popularity and the ensuing ability to command a 
higher price for their services76. 
68. Supra, note 11 ; J.L. BAUDOUIN, «La responsabilité des dommages causés par les 
moyens d'information de masse », (1973) 8 R.J.T. 201. 
69. J. PRADEL, « Les dispositions de la loi n° 70-643 du 17 juillet 1970 sur la protection de la 
vie privée» D. 1971.Chr.lll at 112. 
70. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12. 
71. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, note 68, p. 207. See supra, section 1.4. 
72. H.P. GLENN, «Civil Responsability—Right to Privacy in Quebec—Recent cases», 
supra, note 11, p. 301. See supra, section 1.5. 
73. Charter of Human Right and Freedoms, supra, note 70, art. 49. 
74. Cohen v. Queenswear International Ltd, supra, note 11. 
75. Id., p. 578. 
76. R. LINDON, «La presse et la vie privée», J.C.P. 1965.1.1887, par. 5. 
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The civilian approach to this contradiction has been twofold. Some 
authorities view the public nature of the person and his or her activity as 
creating a presumption of consent to such privacy invasion77. Others view 
the area invaded when a celebrity's photograph is published as lying 
outside the celebrities' restricted sphere of privacy78. Either approach 
results in the denial of recovery to the celebrity. 
The latter approach is clearly the more appropriate one. "Privacy" is a 
completely unfitting characterization for the right to one's style in the 
context of the celebrity engaged in advertising activities. The presumption 
of consent to privacy invasion in the case of public figures is an artificial 
technique aimed solely at resolving the semantic contradiction. 
In the California Supreme Court case of Lugosi79, four reasons were 
advanced80 to demonstrate the inapplicability of the right to privacy in the 
context of the publicity exploitation cases. These reasons are equally 
relevant in the Quebec setting. 
First, the unauthorized use of a celebrity's style for commercial pur-
poses usually causes economic loss and not mental anguish. The "raison 
d'être" of the right to privacy, however, is to relieve the latter, not the 
former. 
Second, "substantial linguistic acrobatics"81 would be needed, in 
most cases, to argue offensive, and thereby damaging, use of the style, as 
usually the celebrity is represented in a flattering light. Obviously, it is in 
the user's interest to portray the celebrity positively in order to benefit 
from his or her reputation and thereby increase sales of the advertised 
product. 
Third, the presumption of consent approach leads to the following 
conclusion : the more public the individual, the more the protection of his 
or her privacy is waived. At the same time, however, the value in the indi-
vidual's identity often multiplies with increased public exposure. Denial of 
protection due to the prominence of the individual, therefore, would result 
in refusal of relief to those to whom the right is most valuable. 
Finally, viewed as a right of privacy, whether on a delictual or an 
extra-patrimonial basis, control of one's style would not be assignable. 
This consequence would greatly reduce the value of the economic interest 
and so discourage the cultivation of public personalities. 
77. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 101. See discussion, supra, in section 1.3. 
78. R. LINDON, supra, note 76; J. PRADEL, supra, note 69, p. 112. 
79. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra, note 13. 
80. Id.. p. 342. 
81. Id. 
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The only possible application of the right to privacy to the celebrity's 
situation arises when the public figure has a long-standing conviction not to 
endorse commercial products of any kind. If a photograph is used to 
associate the celebrity depicted therein with a product, perhaps the celeb-
rity could argue that his or her private decision to remain anonymous vis à 
vis commercial product endorsements has been invaded. Even if possible, 
however, this ground of protection is insufficient as it provides no relief for 
celebrities' styles generally. If style is to be protected, celebrities who 
welcome the opportunity to endorse products should not be excluded. 
Economic losses are suffered by the celebrity and benefits are gained by 
the advertiser, whether or not the star holds such a conviction. Policy 
considerations dictate against drawing this distinction82. 
The unsuitability of the right to privacy basis for relief in the context of 
a public person does not preclude recovery on some other basis. First, 
although an invasion of the right to one's style may coincide with an 
invasion of the right to privacy, the former does not always result in the 
latter83. This proposition is easier to digest when the two rights are viewed 
as indépendant of one another. The Cohen case84 can be explained as an 
example of coincidence of invasion ; in addition to depriving the plaintiff of 
control of her photo for its own commercial purposes, the defendant 
exposed an element of the plaintiffs private life to the world in using a 
photo depicting the plaintiff in a semi-naked state. This decision must be 
contrasted with that in Rebeiro v. Shawinigan Chemicals*5. In that case, 
the plaintiff was awarded damages as compensation for the unauthorized 
use of a photograph of him at his work. In the judgment, no mention of the 
right to privacy is made. This omission makes sense, as the plaintiff was not 
engaged in a private activity in the photo86. Second, the celebrity's image 
usually has commercial value. Subsidiary protection might avail87 in the 
form of protection of a proprietary right88. 
Article 3 of Bill 125, Civil Code of Quebec, 1st Sess., 34th Leg. Que., 
1990, categorizes the right to privacy as a personality right. A list of 
82. See introduction for discussion of policy considerations. 
83. H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, p. 932: «Le droit au respect de l'image ne se 
confond pas toujours avec le droit au respect de la vie privée. C'est un droit plus vaste 
par certains côtés. » 
84. Cohen v. Queenswear International Ltd, supra, note 11. 
85. Rebeiro v. Shawinigan Chemicals, (1973) C S . 389. 
86. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 97. But see, « Civil Responsability — Right to Privacy in 
Quebec — Recent Cases », H.P. GLENN, supra, note 11, in which the author suggests 
that Rebeiro was decided on the basis of privacy. 
87. H.P. GLENN, supra, note 11, p. 889. 
88. See supra, section 1.7. 
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instances of privacy invasion is provided in article 36 of the Bill. The 
particular headings that involve the use of image are : 
36. The following acts, in particular, may be considered as an invasion of the 
privacy of a person : 
(3) Appropriating or using his image or voice while he is in private 
premises ; 
[...] 
(5) Using his name, image, likeness or voice for a purpose other than the 
legitimate information of the public. 
These proposed additions to the codified law of Quebec will not serve 
as protection of style in the publicity exploitation cases contemplated in 
this paper. Poorly constructed, sub-article (3) seems to limit protection 
to a person's image or voice, present in or emitted from a private place. 
The appropriation of a star's style for advertising purposes, however, as 
explained above, involves the use of publicly presented facets of the 
celebrity. Sub-article (5), moreover, although not similarly explicit with 
regard to a limitation to private situations, will probably result in the 
exclusion of celebrities from its scope. This latter listing, although artic-
ulated broadly, is nevertheless an example of privacy invasion. As such, 
the public nature of the celebrity's style will be considered either a deemed 
consent to the invasion or a reason to exclude these situations from the 
scope of privacy. Whether governed by the present law or by the proposed 
reformed law, the protection of style must find as its foundation some other 
legal basis. 
1.7. Proprietary right 
The professional success of a celebrity depends, to a great extent, on 
his or her popularity with the general public. This recognition is gained 
through the cultivation of the celebrity's public personality. The celebrity 
expends much intellectual and creative energy in achieving this recogni-
tion89. If successful, the market force of consumer demand will ensure a 
steady flow of opportunities for the celebrity : lectures, movies, shows and, 
of course, product endorsements. Prospective employers of the celebrity 
find themselves quite willing to pay for the use of facets of his or her style. 
In this way, there is commercial value in the style of the star : 
II est plus que jamais impossible, à l'heure actuelle, de nier la valeur patrimoniale 
et professionnelle de l'image d'un individu, qui est d'ailleurs proportionnelle à sa 
notoriété publique.90 
89. J. STOUFFLET, supra, note 9, par. 26. 
90. J. RAVANAS, supra, note 15, p. 58. 
318 Les Cahiers de Droit ('991) 32 C. de D. 301 
In Deschamps91, the celebrity's pecuniary worth was readily acknow-
ledged and translated in terms of a right of property : 
[The] likenesses of petitioners involve proprietary rights which they are free to 
exploit commercially or to refrain from doing so, and equally free to decide the 
conditions under which such exploitation shall take place.92 
Rothman J. continued this classification of the right to one's style by 
applying the proprietary concept of opposability : 
Now, if the right of commercial exploitation of a film star's name and image is a 
proprietary right, a real right in property which is capable of yielding a financial 
return, then it cannot be appropriated or used by anyone without the consent of its 
owner.93 
Rothman J. found that the use of style, being a "real right in property", is 
governed by articles 406-408 C.C.L.C.94. 
If correct, the application of the concept of property to the right to 
style carries with it several consequences which facilitate recovery for a 
celebrity from an unjustified appropriator. First, the defendant's fault in 
the appropriation need not be demonstrated95. This consequence is doubly 
advantageous as it expands the scope of image appropriation cases to 
relieve petitioners, such as Mr. Deschamps and Ms. Michel, who might not 
have succeeded under a civil responsibility regime96, while easing the 
burden of proof on petitioners generally97. 
91. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5. 
92. Id., p. 940. 
93. Id., p. 940-941. 
94. Id. 
95. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 104. Some jurists would argue, however, that despite 
the subjectivization of style as a right, fault remains relevant. See, supra, note 61. 
96. In Deschamps, the court did not find that Renault Canada had committed a fault in its 
actions. The court held, nevertheless, in favour of the petitioners. 
97. There is some doctrinal policy debate as to whether it is appropriate to require plaintiffs 
to prove fault in theses cases. Molinari stresses the importance of relieving the plaintiff 
of this burden : 
11 importe néanmoins de reconnaître à l'image un droit et aussi éviter un 
système de protection fondé sur la réparation du préjudice moral afin de ne pas 
soumettre celui qui a subi un outrage à la preuve d'une faute ou à celle du 
préjudice. (Supra, note 36, p. 104.) 
Found on the other side of the debate are those who favour the civil responsability basis 
of liability and its ensuing requirement of demonstating fault. In the cases of the use of 
celebrity style, the defendants envisoned are advertisers attempting to profit commer-
cially by associating their product with a public personality. The fact that these adverti-
sers do not commit a wrong in so doing, or that one cannot be proven, should not work to 
the advertisers' benefit in depriving a celebrity who invested in his or her style. By 
excluding cases where fault is not proved, the defendant would be enriched, at the 
expense of the celebrity, without juridical cause. As J. Stoufflet argued, the celebrity 
should have a « monopole d'utilisation professionnelle de son image. » (Supra, note 9, 
par. 28.) 
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Second, the proper intention of the defendant may be irrelevant98. In 
Deschamps, defendant Renault Canada "acted in [nothing] other than 
good faith throughout the period of its involvement."99 The petitioners' 
action, nevertheless, was allowed, as 
[...] when viewed in the context of a right in property or proprietary right [...] it 
matters little whether the appropriation is innocent or otherwise ; the proprietor of 
such an asset or right in either case is entitled to say 'Stop, I don't want you to use 
my property.'100 
This consequence provides benefits similar to those of the first : more 
petitions possible and a relaxed burden of proof. 
Third, relief for interference with a property right does not require 
proof of prejudice101. 
Finally, an interesting consequence of the characterization of the right 
to one's style as a property right is the set of patrimonial effects. These 
are the right's exposure to seizure and transmissibility upon death102. 
The classification of the celebrity's right to his or her style as a 
real right of property presents three conceptual difficulties. First, certain 
authors reject this categorization because of the Christian and Roman 
jurisconsult tendencies of viewing the ownership and alienation of the 
inherent characteristics of man as contrary to public order and good 
morals103. This obstacle to the classification should be dismissed in the case 
of the celebrity. Nerson's difficulty with such ownership lies in the coin-
cidence of the holder of the right and the object of the right : 
Notre corps c'est nous-mêmes et il est contradictoire de prétendre que l'objet du 
droit de propriété sera, non une chose extérieure, mais, le sujet même du droit, que 
l'ensemble étant un, le propriétaire sera précisément la chose possédée.104 
In the case of a celebrity, however, public style is not necessarily the 
inherent essence ofthat person. Rather, it is a created and often calculated 
public guise designed for mass appeal. In this way, the celebrity's public 
style is not one and the same with the celebrity's private personality. It is, 
rather, an intellectual creation, which, like a trademark, is susceptible to 
98. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 104. 
99. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5, p. 938. 
100. Id., p. 941. 
101. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 104. 
102. As noted by B. EDELMAN, supra, note 9, p. 119 : « Il n'est pas inutile de noter que les 
continuateurs de la personne du défunt possèdent un droit à l'image de leur auteur, qui 
leur est transmis à l'égal de tout autre bien. » For a discussion of the advantages of 
transmissibility of the right, see supra, section 1.8. 
103. See, in particular, R. NERSON, supra, note 10, p. 141-142. 
104. Id. 
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ownership. Many authors have rejected Nerson's difficulty with the pro-
prietary nature of the right more generally, as well105. 
Second, one author recognized the conceptual difficulty of conflicting 
rights of property. Professor Patrick Molinari106 asks whether, if classified 
as a right of property, the right to one's style trumps another property right, 
that is, the right in the photograph itself. If not, Molinari explained, 
[...] la personne représentée est propriétaire de son image et l'objet matériel qui la 
représente est propriété de celui qui la possède mais ce dernier, s'il la possède sans 
consentement, aura, malgré son titre à objet matériel, violé le droit du premier à la 
propriété de son image.107 
Ranking the proprietary right to style as superior to that of the material 
photograph is a logical resolution to the potential conflict between these 
two rights. The latter right depends on the former for its value ; in the 
absence of the commercial value of the celebrity's developed public per-
sona, the photograph is worth no more than the paper upon which it is 
printed. To benefit from the value of another's public style, portrayed in 
the photo, the holder of the photograph should be required to obtain prior 
authorization. 
The final conceptual difficulty lies in the traditional civil law discom-
fort with ownership of incorporeal things. Marier maintains that the notion 
of ownership is only applicable to corporeal items108 while the Mazeaud 
Brothers contend that a real right can bear solely on tangible things109. 
According to these authoritative sources, therefore, Rothman J.'s charac-
terization could only apply to tangible objects. As the performers in Des-
champs did not own the photographs themselves, these could not have 
been the corporeal objects of the right. One may find the physical makeup 
of each of the performers to be tangible. Rothman J. took pains, however, 
to include the names of the performers, in addition to their likenesses, as 
objects of the right'10. Clearly, a name is incorporeal. Since there is no 
corporeal object upon which the found right could bear, Rothman J. made 
the common error1" of designating as "owner" the holder of an incor-
poreal item. 
105. B. EDELMAN, supra, note 9, p. 119-120 (style viewed as a dismemberment of property) ; 
P. KAYSER, supra, note 57, p. 82-93 ; J. STOUFFLET, supra, note 9, par. 25 and 31. 
106. P. MOLARNI, supra, note 36, p. 104. 
107. Id. 
108. G. MARLER, The Law of Real Property, Toronto, Carswell, 1932, p. 31. 
109. H.L. et J. MAZENAUD, note 10, t. 1, vol. 1, p. 231. 
110. E.g., Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5, p. 940. 
111. The same mistake is often made in the context of a business' clientele. Often the 
businessman is said to "own" his clientele, but since goodwill is intangible, this is an 
inexact expression: H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, t. 1, vol. 1, p. 231. 
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The reasoning of Rothman J. more correctly leads to the identification 
of the right to style as an intellectual right. Intellectual rights are patrimo-
nial rights whose objects are abstract things112, products of intelligence and 
human creation. Most intellectual "property", as it is normally, although 
perhaps misleadingly, labelled"3, falls under federal legislative jurisdic-
tion114 and is governed by special statutory regimes. Quebec civil law, 
nevertheless, continues to have a residuary role in the regulation of intel-
lectual rights"5. 
To label style a real right would be inexact. The notion of intellectual 
rights is a more recent development on the traditional classification of 
rights as real or personal. Intellectual rights are not easily situated in 
this civil code dichotomy. On one side, real rights were conceived pri-
marily to deal with corporeal things. On the other, intellectual rights can-
not be personal rights as they are not exercised against a debtor. Rather, 
"ils consistent plutôt en un monopole d'exploitation d'une pensée, d'une 
œuvre intellectuelle, d'un nom, d'une clientlèle.""6 In this way, intellec-
tual rights resemble real rights : both provide for exclusivity of exploita-
tion1 17. Thus, the right to style is best viewed as an intellectual "property" 
right, bringing with it at least the first three proprietary consequences listed 
above, as these flow naturally from the recognition of exclusivity of exploi-
tation. The importation of the fourth consequence, patrimonial effects, is 
not as obviously entailed. This consequence should be recognized, how-
ever, due to the pecuniary value of the intellectual right, as discussed 
below"8. The issue that persists is the determination of exactly what is 
entailed by "exclusivity of exploitation". I suggest that this expression 
refers to the holder's right to publicity, examined below. 
1.8. The right to publicity 
In addition to the statutorily-protected right to privacy, courts in 
American jurisdictions have developed alternative style protection, the 
"right to publicity," in the course of interpreting New York law and 
112. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, note 45, at 29 ; S. GINOSSAR, Droit réel, propriété et créance, 
élaboration d'un système rationnel des droits partrimoniaux, Paris, R. Pichon et 
R. Durand-Auzias, 1960, p. 187. 
113. A. WEILL, F. TERRE and P. SIMLER, Droit civil : Les biens, 3e éd., Paris, Dalloz, 1985, 
p. 39. 
114. Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c i l s.91 (22) and (23). 
115. Id., s. 92 (13) (under the head of "Property and Civil Rights in the Province"). 
116. A. WEILL, F. TERRE et P. SIMLER, supra, note 113. 
117. Id. ; H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, t. 1, vol. 1, p. 231. 
118. Supra, section 1.8. 
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California law. Haelan119 provides the first articulation of this right and its 
underlying rationale : 
It is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and 
[base]ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure 
of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in news-
papers, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield 
them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their picture.'20 
Today, more than ever, a valuable by-product of one's prominence in 
society is one's advertising potential. In fact, for some would-be celeb-
rities, in particular in the field of sports, the motivating force driving them 
towards excellence in their field is the possibility of acquiring product 
promotion contracts. From the advertiser's perspective, this means of 
product promotion is very effective, as it allows for the "fusion of the 
celebrity's identity with the product"121 and the resulting benefit to the 
advertiser of the star's goodwill : 
The sale of one's persona in connection with the promotion of commercial prod-
ucts has... become big business.'22 (emphasis added) 
Acquiring goodwill in one's reputation involves a serious investment of 
money, time and creative energy : 
Years of labor may be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues 
are sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some medium of 
commercial protection.'23 
If protection of style was limited to invasion of privacy relief, an advertiser 
would be able to appropriate, without authorization, the benefits of the 
celebrity's goodwill124. At the same time, this appropriation would, first, 
deprive the celebrity of the payoff due to him from his or her investment. 
Second, it would disrupt the celebrity's control over the use of his or her 
style. Third, it might substantially alter his or her style by association with 
and suggested approval of certain products. Finally, it may arrest his or her 
original vocation, the celebrity's profession, due to over-exposure. This 
scenario seemed unjust to American courts and so the "right to publicity" 
was born. 
119. Haelan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., supra, note 113. 
120. Id., p. 868. 
121. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra, note 13, p. 336. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See supra, section 1.6., with respect to the absence of protection for celebrities on the 
basis of privacy. 
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Although the nature of this right was unclear at first125, it became 
accepted that the right of publicity is a property right126. In Lugosi the 
California Supreme Court held that the right was assignable and transmissi-
ble upon death and the court borrowed from copyright law to hold that the 
right would be recognized for the subject's lifetime plus 50 years127. This 
span was adopted in order to provide "incentive for the investment of 
resources in one's profession"128 by removing the risk of advertisers re-
ceiving 
[...] a windfall in the form of freedom to use with impunity the name or likeness of a 
deceased celebrity who may have worked his or her entire life to attain celebrity 
status.'29 
On the other hand, perpetual protection was denied for three reasons. 
First, protection by immediate family members was viewed as incentive 
enough. Second, the celebrity's need to control the commercial use of his 
or her style was said to cease with his or her death, as such control could no 
longer further his or her professional activities. Finally, with time, the 
celebrity identity was said to be "woven into the fabric of history."130 
Eventually, the court said, facets of the star's style become part of the 
public domain and should not be subject to the perpetual control of the 
descendants of the celebrity. 
This American foundation for the celebrity's right to his or her style 
provides perfect protection in the scenarios envisioned in this paper. The 
question then becomes : does the right of publicity fit into the traditions of 
civil law, and if so, how? 
The only hints of such a right in civil law are found in French lawyer 
Bernard Edelman's article, « Liberté et création dans la propriété littéraire 
et artistique. Esquisse d'une théorie du sujet. »131 In his search for the basis 
of the right to one's image, Edelman recharacterized the object of the right : 
Le fondement de cette jurisprudence révèle la nature de la patrimonialisation de 
l'homme [...] En effet, ce que le droit protège, ce n'est point l'image — ou la 
personnalité — en tant que telle, c'est l'utilisation qu'on en peut faire sans le 
125. See Haelan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., supra, note 13, p. 868: 
"Whether it be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial ; for here, as often elsewhere, the 
tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecun-
iary worth." 
126. See P. FELCHER and E. RUBIN, « Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by 
the Media», (1979) 88 Yale L.J. \511,x>. 1593. 
127. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra, note 13, p. 342-345. 
128. Id., p. 344. 
129. Id. 
130. Id., p. 344. 
131. B. EDELMAN, supra, note 9. 
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consentement de son auteur. Autrement dit, il est admis que l'homme peut 'vendre 
son âme' sinon au diable, du moins au marchand—ce qui ne présente aucun 
caractère goethéen, loin s'en faut — et ce que protège le droit c'est l'utilisation que 
l'auteur a voulu lui donner [...] L'homme est juge de la publicité de lui même 
(nemo plus juris [...] pourrait-on dire), et si on lui prend plus qu'il n'a voulu 
donner, il lui est dû réparation, non point parce que son 'intimité' aété violée, mais 
bien plutôt parce qu'elle a été utilisée indûment, c'est-à-dire sans son consen-
tement.'32 
Edelman's approach is interesting in that it points to the real interest that a 
celebrity wishes to shield, that is, the use of his or her style for publicity 
purposes. It is incorrect, however, to characterize the object of the right in 
civil law as the use of style itself. Rather, the protection of the right to 
publicity fits into civil law as recognition of the exclusivity of exploitation 
and the resulting benefits of the intellectual proprietary right held by the 
celebrity. In this way, the right to publicity is protected in Quebec, not as a 
property right in itself, as is the case in the United States, but rather, by 
way of protection of the intellectual "property" holder's rights of usus and 
fructus. 
As a pecuniarily-valuable intellectual proprietary right, the celebrity's 
right to style should be transmissible perpetually, as are real rights in the 
civil law. It is true that a celebrity may become part of history. By recog-
nizing style as a perpetual proprietary right, however, the public would not 
be denied access to the general use of the long-deceased celebrity's style. 
Rather, only non-authorized publicity exploiters would be precluded from 
such use. This result can be explained by keeping sight of the basis for the 
patrimonialization of this right, that is, the commercial value of the style. 
According to the reasoning in Lugosii33, the use of William Shakespeare's 
photograph in a commercial, for example, would be less worthy of protec-
tion today than it was during the late playwright's life. The historical value 
of his distinctive style, however, should notjustify its commercial exploita-
tion. On the other hand, no one is precluded from using Shakespeare's 
photograph for purposes that do not involve profitting commercially from 
his peculiar style. The only problem that arises with perpetual transmis-
sibility of the right to one's style is a logistical one : how does the advertiser 
determine the appropriate party to contact in order to obtain the necessary 
authorization for the commercial use of the ancestor's style ? This logistical 
problem does not warrant denial of the transmissibility of the right. 
132. Id., p. 121. (Emphasis added.) 
133. Lugosiv. Universal Pictures, supra, note 13. 
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1.9. Substitution/passing off 
In the common law jurisdictions of Canada, one cause of action used in 
cases of publicity exploitation of celebrity photographs is "passing off. 
This tort was originally relied upon to preclude manufacturers from re-
presenting their goods as those of another in order to capitalize on the 
goodwill acquired by the other manufacturer and thereby increase their 
own products' sales. The cases of Krouse134 and Äthans135 are two exam-
ples of the acceptance by courts of this basis for recovery136. 
The application of the traditional''passing off' cause of action to right 
to style cases is not a perfect one. In the style cases, it is nonsensical to say 
that the defendants are representing their goods as being the celebrity's 
style137. Rather, they are misrepresenting their goods as being endorsed by 
the celebrity. At trial in Krouse, this conceptual misfit was brushed aside : 
I do not see any difference between A passing off B's endorsement as being C's 
and A either fabricating C's endorsement or using C's picture without permission. 
In either situation, C suffers the very injury which passing off is intended to 
remedy.138 
On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal the applicability of ' 'passing off ' 
to style cases was not challenged by the parties. 
The only way to reconcile this incongruence is to characterize the 
likely confusion as being between the celebrity's and the defendant's 
respective abilities to promote. So characterized, the analysis enters the 
realm of the celebrity's right to publicity139. 
Broadly speaking, the action in "passing off is founded upon unjust 
enrichment140. In order to succeed, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that 
the photograph used identifies the celebrity. In other words, the celebrity's 
features depicted in the photo must be distinctive of that celebrity. In 
Krouse, the defendant Chrysler Canada distributed a spotter'4' on which 
was printed a photo of the plaintiff football star. Although the action photo 
did not clearly show the face of Krouse, the fact that he was photographed 
134. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., supra, note 12. 
135. Äthans v. Canadian Adventures Clamp Ltd, supra, note 12. 
136. Although in both cases the celebrity plaintiffs failed on this basis on the facts. 
137. Although this may be the correct articulation in the case of look-alikes and sound-alikes. 
See supra, section 2.4. 
138. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd, (1972) 2 O.R. (2d) 133, p. 152. 
139. Canvassed, supra, section 1.8. 
140. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd, supra, note 138, p. 134. 
141. Id., p. 136-137. A spotter is a device which identifies the line-up of the teams playing in 
football games. 
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in his number 14 sweater led the Ontario High Court to conclude that the 
identification requirement was fulfilled142. 
Second, the celebrity must prove that the defendant's use of the photo 
will likely cause the relevant public to " 'confuse the profession, business 
or goods of the plaintiff with the profession, business or goods of the 
defendant.' " I43 In Äthans144, the photograph of a celebrity water-skier 
was used by the defendant summer camp operator on the cover of a 
promotional brochure. The plaintiffs inability to meet the condition of 
likelihood of confusion led to failure in his action : 
The decisive point, however, is that, as I hold, it is improbable that the relevant 
segments of the public who would read the advertisement and the brochure would 
associate the business of C.A.C. with the athlete, George Äthans.145 
The brochure was designed to attract parents, unknowledgeable in the 
sport of waterskiing and unable to identify the drawing with Äthans, who 
wished to send their children to a summer camp ; the relevant public, 
parents, would not likely have been confused. 
The final criterion in a "passing off' action is a field of activity 
common to both the plaintiff and the defendant. In Krouse146, a football 
player and a car manufacturer were held not to be engaged in a common 
field of activity. There seems to have been a relaxation of this requirement 
recently, however, as is demonstrated by the Äthans case : 
The problem for the plaintiff lies not with the 'common field' element because the 
plaintiff and the defendant are both to a greater or lesser degree engaged in the 
business of exploiting the sport of water-skiing commercially.147 
It seems clear that Henry J. was influenced in this regard by the extensive 
personal commercial promotion undertaken by Mr. Äthans. 
If accepted as applicable to the style cases, the "passing off' basis 
could be used for recovery in Quebec. "Passing off, a subset of "la 
concurrence déloyale", was first held to be an available civil law delictual 
cause of action in Republique Française v. Hymani4S. Nadeau recog-
nized the existence of this delict, as well, calling it "la substitution de 
produits" : 
[Elle] consiste à offrir en vente au public et a lui vendre des marchandises en lui 
faisant croire qu'elles sont manufacturées par un autre, soit par l'usage d'étiquet-
142. Id., p. 145. 
143. Id., p. 150, quoting McCW/ocA v. Lewis A. May (Produce Distributors), Ltd, (1947)2 AU 
E.R. 845. 
144. Äthans v. Canadian Adventures Camps Ltd, supra, note 12. 
145. Id., p. 433. 
146. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd, supra, note 12, p. 236. 
147. Äthans v. Canadian Adventures Camps Ltd, supra, note 12, p. 433. 
148. République Française c. Hyman, (1972) 31 B.R. 22. 
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tes semblables, même s'il peut y avoir des points de dissemblance entre les deux, 
soit par l'usage d'un nom commercial semblable, soit par contrefaçon, bref par 
tous moyens frauduleux ou dolosifs ou même encore par toutes représentations 
fausses, de nature à nuire.149 
In Deschamps150, Rothman J. indicated his acceptance of the Ontario High 
Court's reasoning in Krousei5> with respect to "passing off and cryp-
tically imported this reasoning into Quebec law : ' 'Moreover, the action for 
'passing-off has long been recognized in Quebec."152 
In a more recent case, the Quebec Superior Court hinted in its rea-
soning that it would accept the substitution foundation for the right to one ' s 
style. In Thériault c. Association-montréalaise d'action récréative et cul-
turelle153, two comedians, Ding and Dong, requested an interlocutory 
injunction to preclude the respondent from broadcasting a radio advertise-
ment in which the petitioners' characteristic expressions were used with-
out authorization. Although the injunction was not granted, the Court's 
analysis included consideration of: the distinctiveness of these expres-
sions to the petitioners154; the common nature of the parties' fields of 
activity in terms of similarity of audience155 ; and the likelihood of con-
fusion, that is, the likelihood of the public's association of the expressions, 
as used by the respondent, with the petitioners156. 
If this basis is considered appropriate in the photograph cases in other 
jurisdictions, then there is no reason why the right to one's style in Quebec 
law could not be so founded. In fact, as seen above, substitution has 
already been applied, although not in so many words. This basis, however, 
is most fitting in the context of look-alikes and sound-alikes157. 
149. A. NADEAU, supra, note 18, p. 224. 
150. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5, p. 942-943. 
151. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd, supra, note 12. 
152. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5, p. 943. 
153. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), (1984) 
CS. 946. For a more expansive discussion of this case, see supra, section 2.3. 
154. Id., p. 953 : «... ces expressions ont-elles acquis un sens secondaire lorsque prononcées 
et utilisées par les requérants point que leur utilisation par d'autres suivant le style des 
requérants risque de causer de la confusion dans le public et peut laisser croire qu'il y a 
association entre les requérants et ceux qui utilisent ainsi ces expressions ? » (emphasis 
added.) 
155. Id., p. 949 : « [Les requérants] prétendent que le public auquel s'adresse cette publicité 
est identique à celui auquel eux-mêmes s'adressent. » 
156. Supra, note 154. 
157. See section 2.4. 
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1.10. Conclusion 
In summary, the right to style in the context of the celebrity is best 
protected in Quebec as an intellectual "property" right, with control of the 
right to publicity resulting from that right. Defamation and contract are 
possible foundations but both are too narrow. Courts are reluctant to rely 
on unjust enrichment when other remedies are available. The right to 
personality, whether inclusive of or independent of the right to privacy, is 
an inappropriate basis. The right to personality basis seems to ignore the 
pecuniary value of the celebrity's style, while the right to privacy basis 
seems to have no application to public individuals engaged in public activi-
ties. Finally, substitution does not fit the photograph scenario easily, but 
may be applicable in the case of look-alikes and sound-alikes. 
2. The scope of style : extensions of photograph publication control 
to other expressions of style 
2.1. Generally 
Celebrities are differentiated mainly by trivia of per-
sonality. To be known for your personality actually 
proves you a celebrity [...] [Celebrities] succeed 
by skillfully distinguishing themselves from others 
essentially like them. They do this by minutiae of 
grimace, gesture, language and voice. We identify 
Jimmy ("Schnozzola") Durante by his nose, Bob 
Hope by his fixed smile, Jack Benny by his stingi-
ness, Jack Paar by his rudeness, Jackie Gleason by 
his waddle, Imogene Coca by her bangs. 
Daniel J. Boorstin 
in The Image, 1964158 
The very limited body of Quebec right-to-style jurisprudence involv-
ing photograph use seems rich and varied when compared to the near 
nonexistence of cases involving other aspects of a celebrity's style. As 
Boorstin indicated in the somewhat dated examples above, identifying 
aspects of a celebrity's personality include voice, characteristic use of 
language, mannerisms, attitude and general disposition in addition to pho-
tographed physical appearance. An advertiser's plan to appropriate a star's 
goodwill would not be hindered if the right to style was limited to the 
protection of photographs. Simply by using another of the celebrity's 
distinguishing characteristics in its advertisement, a promoting company 
158. D.J. BOORSTIN, supra, note 1, p. 65. 
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could replicate any association that may have been drawn by the public 
between a photograph of the public personality and its product. 
Clearly, policy considerations identical to those underlying photo-
graph control warrant protection for these other facets of style. The devel-
opment of a distinctive voice, typical mannerisms and usual expressions, 
all catering to the public's tastes, requires investments of time, money and 
creative input. The investments' dividends are no less deserved by the 
celebrity in the cases of these caracteristics than in the case of photographs 
merely because the members of the former group are generally thought to 
be less obvious indicators of identity. If elements of a person's style have 
pecuniary value in that they can captivate the attention of and elicit a 
desired response from the consuming public, then they should be protected 
by law, regardless of type. 
The absence of judicial elaboration on the right to style beyond pho-
tograph cases may be attributable to either of two factors. First, such 
disputes may just not arise. If this is the proper explanation, then it must be 
realized that this lack of controversy cannot be attributed to the scarcity of 
such activity on the part of advertisers. One need only look to the pre-
cedents of our geographical and cultural neighbours, common law Canada 
and the United States, to witness the prevalence of celebrity style appro-
priate in advertising. Thus, the absence of such litigation can only be due to 
plaintiffs' ignorance of their rights. 
A more likely cause of this jurisprudential lacuna, however, may be 
the terminological confusion surrounding the word ' 'image' ', used in desig-
nating the right. As already canvassed above159, the French usage of 
"image" conveys the notion of physical depiction of an object. In English, 
on the other hand, this word communicates a more comprehensive idea : 
the concept of a person held by the public. This discrepancy has lead to 
ambiguity in jurisprudential and doctrinal analysis of the right. Professor 
Molinari limits the ways "l 'image" can be represented to photographs, 
caricatures and paintings160. However in Deschamps161, ajudgment written 
in English, "likeness" was listed as an object of the right, in addition to 
"photograph", suggesting a possible broader scope for "image". The 
judicial reluctance to acknowledge other aspects of a person's style as 
protected may result, in this way, from an unwarranted adherence to the 
more limited French definition. When analyzed in terms of its appropriate 
legal foundation, an intellectual right, it becomes clear that the right to style 
159. See introduction. 
160. P. MOLINARI, supra, note 36, p. 99. 
161. Deschamps v. Renault Canada, supra, note 5. 
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shields a broader array of emanations of one's style than that suggested by 
"l'image". I will demonstrate, in this part, that the appropriation of voice 
or characteristic sayings is as worthy of condemnation as the appropriation 
of photographs. 
Once accepted that the reproduction of other aspects of a person's 
style may be actionable, the issue of whether near reproductions of style 
are also actionable arises. The case envisioned are those involving celeb-
rity look-alikes and sound-alikes. Midler162 exemplifies the latter scenario. 
The advertisement in that case did not feature Ms. Midler's voice; it 
featured, rather, that of another singer who distilled the distinctive ele-
ments of Ms. Midler's singing and replicated them as closely as possible. 
These situations will be explored and analyzed both as instances of intel-
lectual right appropriation and as instances of substitution, i.e., unfair 
competition. 
2.2. Voice 
In France voice is characterized as a right of personality, distinct from 
image : 
La jurisprudence décide que la voix est un attribut de la personnalité, ce qui donne 
à l'individu le droit de s'opposer à son imitation lorsque celle-ci, surtout utilisée à 
fins de publicité commerciale, créerait une confusion ou tout autre préjudice.163 
The acceptance of this extension of extra-patrimonial rights is eased in 
jurisprudence and doctrine by drawing an analogy to visual appearance ; 
voice, a less tangible personal attribute, is redesignated "l'image so-
nore."164 
This parallel between a person's facial and bodily construction and his 
or her voice is properly drawn by French jurists. Voice can be charac-
terized by the pitch and intensity of the sounds emitted, as well as by their 
frequency and syllabic rhythm. Often people are as immediately identifia-
ble by their utterances as they are by their physical appearance. Some 
authors have gone so far so as to note that this oral personal stamp " 'est 
aussi caractéristique que ses empreintes digitales.' "165 
Although correct in its analogy of voice to physical appearance, the 
French approach should not be followed, when dealing with celebrities, in 
its ultimate classification of voice as an extra-patrimonial right of person-
162. Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, supra, note 4. 
163. H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, supra, note 10, p. 933 (Emphasis added.) 
164. Dames Dimitriadou et Calagerpoulos c. Radio France, Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 19 mai 1982, 
D.1983.147; J.C.P. 1978,11.19002, par. 1, note D. BÉCOURT. 
165. Quoted in D. BÉCOURT, id., par. 3. 
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ality. The susceptibility of a celebrity's voice to pecuniary evaluation 
suggests that this categorization is unfitting. 
Made up of distinguishing elements, as is visual appearance, voice is a 
personal trait which a celebrity can develop to satisfy public tastes and 
thereby increase his or her popularity : 
L'identification renvoie également aux aspects d'ordre subjectif inhérents cette 
fois à la personnalité À plus forte raison lorsque la voix représente l'instrument de 
travaille [e.g.] d'un comédien réputé, au débit singulier et aux inflexions aisément 
reconnaissables, qui ont contribué à sa notoriété auprès du grand public.166 
Examples of identifiable voices abound. Bette Midler trained her singing 
voice to the point of popular appreciation and identification. Comedians 
Emo Phillips and Bobcat Goldthwait each cultivated a public personality, 
identifiable, inter alia, by their respective stage voices : the former speaks 
in a whining, childish manner while the latter gasps his jokes in a fright-
ened, wheezing way. 
Once developed, the voice can be an important source of a star's 
commercial gain, as can his or her physical appearance. Audiences wil-
lingly pay to hear comedians deliver witticisms, actors interpret dialogue 
and vocalists sing, each with his or her trademark style. Advertisers may 
be willing to compensate celebrities for the use of their voices in radio 
and television advertisements. The association between celebrity and 
product, evident in the photograph cases, can likewise be thrust upon the 
consuming public, thereby enabling the product to benefit from the celeb-
rity's goodwill. 
Having a commercial value, the star's voice should be categorized as a 
subset of the intellectual right to style. The object of this right, in the case of 
voice, is not the material audio recording itself, nor the particular words 
spoken167 ; nor is the object the human vocal cords, as the star's creative 
energy is exerted to develop the style of expression and not to alter the 
physical voice box itself. The object of the right is, rather, the incorpo-
real pattern of oral expression adopted by a particular individual. As in 
the case of photographs, granting precedence to this intellectual right over 
the corporeal property interest held in the tape is not problematic. A 
recording of Bette Midler's singing derives the bulk of its commercial value 
from Ms. Midler's investment in the style of her singing. Limiting the 
employment of the tape to the uses authorized by Ms. Midler merely 
impedes the tape owner's acquisition of an unwarranted windfall while 
preventing any impoverishment of Ms. Midler. 
166. Id., par. 3. 
167. Typical expressions as an element of style will be canvassed supra, section 2.3. 
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Extending the right to style from visual appearance to oral expression 
does not require a large conceptual leap. Both are instruments of the 
expression of style ; both may contain significant commercial value. Dif-
ficulties arise, however, when the extension of the right is pressed further. 
2.3. Typical expressions 
An interesting attempt at widening the right to style was undertaken in 
Thériault168. The petitioners in that case were Ding and Dong, two well-
known Montreal comedians. They sought an interlocutory injunction to 
stop the broadcast, by the respondent, of a radio advertisement for La 
Ronde, a Montreal amusement park. As in Midler169, the advertising 
agency hired by the respondent approached the petitioners, requesting 
their participation in the commercial. Ding and Dong, however, refused 
this offer. Unwilling to abandon its publicity brainstorm, the agency pro-
duced the ad employing other performers and a script which included Ding 
and Dong's typical expressions, "Est bonne ! Est bonne ! Est bonne !" and 
"Est effrayante". The court reviewed testimonial and survey evidence and 
found that these phrases 
[...] aient été développées, popularisées, lors de spectacles présentés par les 
requérants, au point que ceux qui les ont vus associent ces expressions à la 
personnalité des requérants.170 
Despite this finding, however, the court refused to grant the injunction. It 
doubted, on the particular facts of the case, that the rights invoked by the 
petitioners had been invaded and found the balance of conveniences to 
weigh in favour of the respondent171. 
The utility of this case in terms of the development of the right to style 
depends upon the characterization of this right adopted by the court. The 
decision typifies, unfortunately, the category-overlap confusion encoun-
tered in Part I of this paper. The court asked first, "les requérants ont-ils 
des droits de propriété reconnus par la loi à l'égard de ces expressions ?"172 
Desjardins J. proceeded to recognize "en droit civil ce droit qui n'est 
qu'une des nombreuses facettes du droit à l'étanchéité et à la protection de 
lapersonnalite."*73 The court finally settled on a "passing off' analysis but 
168. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153. 
169. Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, supra, note 4. 
170. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153, p. 953. 
171. Id., p. 957. 
172. Id., p. 951. 
173. Id., p. 951-952. 
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erroneously labelled this approach misapprapriation of personality, "un 
délit reconnu parle common law dans Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd.'"114 
(all emphases added). Further confusing the designation of the appropriate 
nature of the right, the petitioners employed innovative terminology in 
arguing that the right invaded was one "de l'entertainer."175 
The respondent's utilization of the phrases in question constitutes an 
invasion of Ding and Dong's intellectual rights to style just as would have 
the use of either photos depicting them or recordings of their voices. 
At first sight, control of typical expressions does not seem as obvi-
ously worthy of protection as does physical appearance or voice. Three 
reasons underlie this misleading appearance. First, one may instinctively, 
but erroneously, assume that the verbal expression of ideas is already 
protected by federal copyright laws. The Copyright Act176 merely accords 
protection to the material representations of original ideas : written words, 
recorded sounds and photographed pictures177. Although particular typical 
expressions may convey novel ideas, federal intellectual property law does 
not protect characteristic phrases until they are embodied in some sort of 
physical representation. 
Second, as intangible as visual appearance and voice might seem, a 
person's usual method of juxtaposing certain words seems that much more 
abstract. The traditional civilian aversion to protection of any but cor-
poreal objects may account for the attitude that shielding typical expres-
sions exceeds the limits that will be tolerated. This approach, however, is 
outdated in today's world in which much wealth is found in incorporeal 
corporate rights. In modern times there is no justification for denying the 
value of something, and consequently refusing to protect it, merely be-
cause it cannot be seen or touched. 
Finally, perhaps the notion of protection of typical expressions causes 
discomfort when viewed as the granting of a monopoly over the use of 
words in popular language. Desjardins J. rejected the availability of this 
possibility : "Pouvoir s'approprier un usage exclusif de ces expressions est 
contraire à la jurisprudence."178 This formulation of the right's power, 
174. Id., p. 952. At trial in Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd, suppra, note 12, two separate 
bases for the right were held to be available. One was the tort of "passing off', i.e., a 
misrepresentation of the defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff (p. 152) while the 
other was misappropriation of personality, the property right of a person to the elements 
of his or her identity (id.). 
175. Id., p. 951. 
176. Copyright Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. C-41. 
177. Id., s.5, as read with s.2. 
178. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153, p. 953. 
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however, is incorrect. Just as the worth of visual appearance and voice is 
not derived from the photo and the recording, respectively, the value of 
typical expressions does not arise from the words themselves. The words, 
the photo and the recording are merely the instruments by which the 
conveyance of the celebrity's appearance, voice and expressions is facili-
tated. The former group consists of the tools of expression and are not the 
objects protected by the right to style. The value of the latter group, which 
consists of three facts of the celebrity's public personality, is derived from 
the celebrity's use of these attributes to convey his or her style which has 
been developed over time. 
In the case of characteristic sayings, the combination of the rhythm 
and pronunciation of the words, the cynical effect and the context of the 
phrases, the facial expression of the speaker and the background, all 
convey the celebrity's style. The development of these features, however, 
requires investments of time, money and creative energy, as does the 
cultivation of a public appearance and voice, in order to distill and respond 
to popular public tastes. A successful blending of these elements increases 
the speaker's notoriety and adds to his celebrity. As explained above, 
value is directly proportional to fame. The star who is known for certain 
expressions is able to demand significant sums for the oral delivery of these 
characteristic phrases. As in the case of photo or voice exploitation in 
advertising, the advertiser who uses these expressions without the consent 
of their author would reap the benefit of the celebrity's goodwill179. The use 
of these sayings causes identification with the star. When juxtaposed with a 
product, the phrases suggest endorsement by the celebrity, thereby fusing 
the latter's goodwill with that of the former. The intellectual right analysis, 
in this way, applies to typical expressions as well as to photos and voice. 
The Court in Thériault[S0, however, did not adopt this analysis. Desjar-
dins J. based her reasoning, instead, on substitution. Her Ladyship focus-
sed on the "get-up"181 of the expressions : 
179. From a practical point of view, cases of typical expressions often involve sound-alikes, 
as well. This double style-appropriation situation would occur when, in addition to the 
same expressions being spoken, the voice used is intended to sound as near as possible to 
that of the author of the phrases. These two aspects of style, typical expressions and 
sound-alikes, will be analyzed separately, however, as they are theoretically different in 
nature. See supra, section 2.4. 
180. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153. 
181. Defined in H.G. Fox, The Canadian Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 3d 
ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1972, p. 553 as: "The shape, size, colour, wrappers and 
adornment and, possibly, appearance, with which the producer or trader endows them, 
as well as the lettering and arrangement of the label. It is, in other words, the dress in 
which the goods are presented to the purchasing public." 
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Les requérants ont-ils cependant acquis un droit à l'égard de l'arrangement, du 
style de l'habillage... utilisé dans la prononciation de ces mots? En d'autres 
termes, ces expressions ont-elles acquis un sens secondaire lorsque prononcées et 
utilisées par les requérants, au point que leur utilisation par d'autres suivant le 
style des requérants risque de causer de la confusion dans le public et peut lais-
ser croire qu'il y a association entre les requérants et ceux qui utilisent ces 
expressions ?182 
The Court found that the parties were, in fact, engaged in a common 
activity ; although not engaged in an identical profession, both parties were 
found to "tente[r] d'exercer un attrait auprès d'un public-cible à peu près 
identique."183 Despite this holding, relief was refused as confusion was 
unlikely ; the expressions had been sung in the commercial, whereas Ding 
and Dong did not present themselves to the public as singers184. 
The application of the passing off approach in this case was inap-
propriate. Desjardins J. never articulated the items which were being 
passed off for each other. Clearly, La Ronde, the object of the adverti-
sement, was not being passed off as the comedians. This interpretation is 
nonsensical. The only possible explanations is either that the respondent 
was attempting to suggest that Ding and Dong are part of La Ronde's 
attractions or that the petitioners' ability to promote their show was being 
passed off as that of the respondent. Both of these suggestions are far-
fetched. A more realistic articulation of the respondent's motive is to 
benefit from the use of Ding and Dong's cultivated notoriety, identifiable 
by their favorite expressions, in order to attract attention and evoke a 
favourable réponse from the consuming public. The ability of these expres-
sions to accomplish this task is a valuable asset worthy of recognition as an 
intellectual right. 
The substitution analysis of the right to style, although unsuitable in 
the Thériault-type case, can be appropriate in other circumstances. These 
situations will be explored in the next section. 
2.4. Look-alikes and sound-alikes 
Midler]&5, an American case, exemplifies the sound-alike situation. In 
this case Bette Midler's vocal style was appropriated by an advertiser, not 
by using a recording of Ms. Midler's distinctive voice, but rather, by 
backing up the visuals of a television commercial with an imitation of her 
singing. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
182. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153, p. 953. 
183. Id., p. 955. 
184. Id., 956. 
185. Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, supra, note 4. 
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found in favour of Ms. Midler, it unfortunately provided little precedential 
guidance in its holding. Noonan J. felt that a general finding of tort sufficed : 
We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to 
advertise merchandises is actionable. We hold only that when a distinctive voice 
of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell 
a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a 
tort.186 
Despite this absence of judicial elaboration, Midler represents a po-
tential triumph in the expansion of celebrity right to style. As is the case 
with typical modes of expression, situations involving sound-alikes and 
their visual counterparts, look-alikes, require grappling with aspects of 
style more intangible than those encountered in the photograph and voice-
recording cases. Although in all of these cases the value of the celebrity's 
identifying feature is found in his or her particular style and not in its 
medium of expression, style assumes a more material existence when 
embodied in photographs and voice-recordings. When dealing with sound-
alikes and look-alikes, however, it is not possible to say that the advertiser 
has appropriated the copied celebrity's physical appearance or voice, as 
the imitator's physical face or voice is being used. A celebrity can only 
claim, rather, that his or her manner of vocal or visual expression has been 
used. 
There is no less reason to hold the unauthorized advertiser who uses a 
celebrity sound- or look-alike acountable to the star than the unauthorized 
advertiser who uses that celebrity's actual photo or voice, despite the 
reduced palpabibility of some facets of style. As already explained, a star's 
public personality consists of mannerisms and other elements of behaviour 
which facilitate popular identification of the celebrity. The power of these 
elements to elicit public identification and positive popular reaction is 
valuable. The celebrities themselves are best able to reproduce the con-
stitutive elements of their respective style, of course, as they are the 
original developers of these traits. Others, however, may be capable, as 
well, of duplicating the formative facets of a star's style and thereby of 
reconstructing the star's public personality. Viewed in this light, the sound-
alike and look-alike cases are, in reality, no different from the voice and 
photograph cases. The object of the right is identical in all instances, i.e., 
the celebrity's incorporeal, intellectual "proprietary" right of style. 
A wrinkle appears, however, in the sound- and look-alike cases. If 
style is an intellectual "proprietary" right, then any use ofthat style, at 
least for commercial purposes, would be a compensable invasion of the 
186. Id., p. 463. 
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right. This being so, theatrical impersonators187 wouls be unable to engage 
in their professional activities without fear of civil prosecution. This poten-
tial consequence is undesirable from the perspective of policy. Robert 
Judge, in his analysis of celebrity look-alikes and sound-alikes188, suggests 
that impersonators ' 'should not be deprived of earning a living'89 and notes 
that the American approach has been to examine the 
[...] context and purposes of the particular look-alike or sound-alike in question 
[...] to determine if such use predominantly serves a social function valued by the 
protection of free speech [...] If the portrayal mainly serves the purpose of [...] 
providing the free expression of creative talent which contributes to society's 
cultural enrichment, then the portrayal generally will be immune from liability. If, 
on the other hand, the portrayal functions primarily as a means of commercial 
exploitation the such immunity will not be granted.190 
Precluding this entertainer from using his talent would be socially disad-
vantageous as it would deprive the public of this appreciated art form. 
Imposing a requirement upon the impersonator to collect authorizations 
from each star imitated would make his or her performance practically 
unfeasible. 
In addition to policy reasons, an appreciation of the rationale under-
lying the right to style dictates against subjecting impersonators to liability. 
Talent is required in order to impersonate another successfully. This skill is 
not appropriated from the mimicked celebrity, but rather, emanates from 
the impersonator himself or herself. When a theatrical impersonator imi-
tates a famous person, moreover, he or she does not seek to reap the value 
ofthat star's style. André-Philippe Gagnon, for example, does not attempt 
to fuse his identity with that of the celebrities he mimics in order to benefit 
from their popular reputations. When Mr. Gagnon copies Bruce Spring-
steen's demeanor and style of singing, he attracts public attention in his 
own right and not because the audience is fooled into believing that "The 
Boss" stands before it. Examined in the light of policy and legal rationale, 
the case of the theatrical impersonator must be excluded from the pro-
tected right to style. 
An exception need not be made to acommodate the impersonator as 
his or her act does not even fall within the realm of invaded right to style in 
the first place. Admittedly, the impersonator does employ elements of a 
187. The term "theatrical impersonators" refers to professional performers for whom audi-
ences specifically pay to watch imitations of celebrities ; for example, Rich Little or 
André-Philippe Gagnon. 
188. R. JUDGE, «Celebrity Look-Alikes and Sound-Alikes or Imitation is not the Highest 
Form of Flattery », (1988) 20 C.P.R. (3d) 97. 
189. Id., p. 98. 
190. Id., p. 124. 
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star's style. This use of style, however, does not implicate an appropriation 
of the pecuniarily valuable aspects of this style. Although the intention and 
the motive of the appropriator are not relevant considerations when style is 
classified as an intellectual right191, this analysis of the "context and 
purposes" of the use is not undertaken to determine why the style was 
copied, but rather, to decipher what, in fact, has been appropriated. The 
basis for categorizing a celebrity's style as an intellectual "proprietary" 
right is the style's pecuniary value192. If no value is gained by the imper-
sonation, then to say that the impersonator has invaded the intellectual 
right does not seem appropriate193. 
In contrast to the photograph cases194, the sound-alike and look-alike 
instances are also susceptible to an unfair competition analysis. The prop-
osition that the advertiser is passing off its spokesperson as another in 
requiring that spokesperson to adopt the other's style is not as artificially 
stretched as is the application of substitution to the photograph cases. 
The prerequisite conditions for an action in substitution are designed 
to limit condemnation to defendants deserving of this fate. First, the copied 
trait must be distinctive ofthat particular celebrity. In requiring the partic-
ular manifestation of the star's style to identify that celebrity, the "passing 
off basis pinpoints the source of the commercial value of style. 
Second, the substitution must cause the likelihood of confusion. This 
requirement ensures the exclusion of advertisements in which no associa-
tion is made between the celebrity and the imitator. In particular, this 
condition excludes the theatrical impersonator as long as his or celebrity 
look-alike status is revealed to the public, for in that case the public will not 
be confused with respect to the performer's identity. No matter how exact 
Rich Little's impersonation is, for example, the exposition of his physical 
appearance renders unlikely the confusion between his identity and that of 
the mimicked star. The facts in Thériault195 reveal that Ding and Dong's 
style had been imitated, not only by the defendants, but by André-Philippe 
Gagnon and by Dominique Michel196, as well. The petitioners did not 
191. See supra, section 1.7. 
192. Id. 
193. Of course, it is possible that the celebrity is entitled to relief on some other basis, e.g., 
right to privacy or defamation. 
194. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Lid, and Äthans Canadian Adventures Camps Ltd, supra, 
note 12. 
195. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153. 
196. It is interesting to see the shift in the position of this comedienne. In Deschamps v. 
Renault Canada, supra, note 5, her style was used by another. The tables turn in 
Thériault, however, in which she is now the user of another's style ! 
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pursue these two performers, however, because the performances of these 
two comedians were presented so as to indicate clearly to the audience that 
they were, in fact, impersonators. Cases of theatrical impersonators on 
radio advertisements may present situation in which confusion is more 
likely, as the visuals which usually indicate to the public a distinction 
between the impersonator and the imitated star are absent. Advertisers 
who use impersonators in these circumstances and who do not give notice 
to the audience of such, however, are probably trying to benefit, not from 
the impersonator's talent, but from the star's publicity value and should not 
be excluded from liability. 
Finally, the parties must be engaged in a common field of activity. This 
requirement may present difficulties of application, as usually the defen-
dant-advertiser's business has little to do with the petitioner's field, perfor-
mance. In Midler no common activity was found : 
One minute commercials of the sort the defendants put on would not have 
saturated Midler's audience and curtailed her market. Midler did not do television 
commercials. The defendants were not in competition with her.'97 
Despite this ultimate finding, these words suggest a liberal view of common 
fields : had Ms. Midler not objected to endorsing products generally, the 
parties would have both been partaking in the field of advertising. The 
Quebec trend, furthermore, seems to be even more generous, as demon-
strated by the Thériault case198 in which the similarity of the public targeted 
is sufficient to meet this criterion. 
If these four conditions are met, a celebrity can take action on the basis 
of unjust enrichment when a look-alike and sound-alike is used. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The recognition of the right to style as an intellectual right has far-
reaching protective implications. Although difficult to break style down 
into its constituent parts, once done, these elements appear in forms more 
subtely recognized than the use of photographs. The use of pre-recorded 
voice, typical expressions, sound-alikes and look-alikes are four pos-
sibilities. The limits of the possible applications of the right to style remain 
to be seen. 
197. Bette Midler v. Ford Motor Company, supra, note 4, p. 462. 
198. Thériault c. Association montréalaise d'action récréative et culturelle (1983), supra, 
note 153. 
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Conclusion 
Achieving celebrity status is a goal of many actors, singers, comedians 
and athletes. Fame, contrary to the well-known saying, is usually not 
achieved overnight. On the contrary ; in order to meet this end, a performer 
must invest time, energy and money in himself or herself to cultivate a 
public personality. Part of this required effort involves the pursuit of 
exposure, which serves to reinforce the public's ability to identify that star. 
Unauthorized exposure in commercial advertisements, once fame has 
been attained, is, however, unnecessary from a timing point of view. This 
type of exposure, moreover, deprives the celebrity of the dividends de-
served from the investment made in his or her goodwill, while saving the 
advertiser performer's fees. 
Quebec courts have toyed with the idea of protecting the celebrity's 
public style. The legal approaches undertaken, however, have not been 
consistent. 
The proper legal foundation for the recognition of style is as an intel-
lectual proprietary right. This classification covers the broadest array of 
scenarios, takes account of the pecuniary value of the celebrity's style and 
avoids resorting to fictitious presumptions and a dismantling of historical 
civilian traditions. 
Once the legal basis for style is settled, the reach of this right can be 
pre-determined to a certain extent. The use of a celebrity's photograph, 
voice or typical expressions, or the imitation of these facets of style by 
another, would fall under the protective umbrella of the right to style. 
Future advances in the technological reproduction of human traits may 
provide presently unforeseen cases of style appropriation to which the 
intellectual right analysis of style may be applied. 
